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Aristotle's "Not to Fear" Proof for the Necessary Eternality of the Universe


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Errata

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Back Cover
The original back cover wrongly suggested that Werner Jaeger rejected the Unmoved Mover as an immaterial substance. The point was supposed to be that Jaeger championed the evolution of Aristotle's thought in many areas, a position that helps reconcile inconsistencies in the texts. However, Jaeger himself takes Aristotle to keep until the end of his professional life the Unmoved Mover of No Potentiality of Metaphysics Lambda 6 or something akin to it, like the thinking God of Lambda 7 that has a blissful life (without Jaeger recognizing that the two entities may not be identical, as is discussed vis-a-vis Michael Bordt below). Cf. Jaeger's Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), translated with the author's corrections and additions by Richard Robinson; orig. published in German in 1923; espec. pp. 380-2 and 385-6.
     Furthermore, the cover claimed something that was neither demonstrated nor needed in the book: “They [the later schools of philosophy] all knew that the mature Northern Greek accepted the inherent necessity of the eternal universe, and they embraced that doctrine, too, in spite of variations in details.” Whatever the later schools knew about the details of Aristotle's metaphysics, the crucial point instead is that no one, even Theophrastus (the second head of the Lyceum), seemingly embraces the Unmoved Mover of Pure Actuality for 500 years. This takes us to the final point of clarification regarding the back cover.
     It should be noted that because of space, the beginning of the modern, distorted interpretation of Aristotle's theological views was omitted. As such, the cover might suggest to readers new to this whole topic that subsequent scholars starting with Theophrastus shied away from the Unmoved Mover, which would be shockingly inconsistent with the tradition from the Middle Ages, Renaissance and modern times. The book itself emphasizes that Alexander of Aphrodisias, around 200 CE, is the first to argue (in texts we possess) for the legitimacy of the Unmoved Mover for (the mature) Stagirite, thereby muddying the exegetical waters for all generations to come. In short, Alexander mistakes the youthful, discarded doctrine for Aristotle's mature position and everyone after follows Alexander.
     Finally, some readers have been confused by the use of "contingent/contingency" on the back cover, and it has been dropped so that they can wait until the explanations in Part 1 (see below for more under "Clarification").

Inner Book Block
Pp. 1, 3, 124, 235, 288, 292, and 301 should be read with the above caveats regarding Jaeger. He does, though, consider Metaphysics Lambda 8, including Aristotle's claim that there are (at least) 47 unmoved movers, to be interpolated, probably by a subsequent editor, which is merely one reason for Jaeger suggesting that the Stagirite usually became more empirical as he gained distance from Plato.
The corrected views on Jaeger are presented in the 6th and 7th "digital extensions," as found below.

Clarification

by Gregory L. Scott

A Note on "contingency"
When I first explain "contingency" (p. 86), I do it within the list of meanings of "possibility" that are common for us, as "to be or not to be." Later, when discussing Broadie (p. 87), I give the precise meaning for Aristotle as found in the Prior Analytics, "neither necessary nor impossible." I might add now, because I did not say this in the book, that this is also sometimes called "two-sided possibility" in contrast to "one-sided possibility" that itself is opposed simply to "impossibility." What I call the "ontological" sense of contingency throughout the book is generally the two-sided version: "necessary" is not a property of sentences primarily but has a temporal meaning, namely, "always existing" or "eternal"; "impossible" means "never existing (in an eternity)"; and "possible qua contingent" then must convey "existing at least once, finitely." I also call this the Stagirite's "triangular modal model," but I emphatically take no position on whether or not he used this model in the logical arena (J. Ackrill claims that Aristotle drops the two-sided, ontological model for the logical contexts, all of which I imagine is one especial source of confusion in other, non-logical arenas; cf. my digital extensions, especially "On Sarah Broadie's 'Heavenly Bodies and First Causes'", the URLs of which are given below).

A Note on "The Principle of Plenitude"
I give the Principle of Plenitude early in the book on p. 14 as the third statement in the “'Not to Fear' Proof”:

“3) In infinite time, any (sort of genuine) possibility is actualized (I call this The Principle of Plenitude, following historical usage, or more precisely because of the addition of “sort” and “genuine,” the Principle of Genuine Sortal Plenitude, where “sortal” simply means sorts, kinds, classes, or types of things or of events). ”

Partly I presented the Principle as such because previous scholars used this formulation and because I wanted the most general form possible, to cover both eternal and finite things. While proofing the penultimate and final drafts of the book, I realized that the issues might get very confusing. Because I had noted in passing (on p. 69) Aristotle's undoubted Principle, what in other places I would call, and have called, his primary version:

          “For eternal things, what may be is” (Physics III 4, 203b30).

and because I had then gone on to explain in much more detail four other versions of the Principle (pp. 77-81), including the Principle of Genuine Sortal Plenitude, it occurred to me some readers might think that these last four are the important formulations that various scholars like Hintikka or Broadie, and even the Stagirite himself, rely upon.

I should stress now, then, that the primary version either forms the implicit basis for the others or should be considered a separate, fifth version. As I state on p. 132, the conclusions of this book regarding the necessary eternality of the universe for Aristotle (and the reason he did not keep the Unmoved Mover past middle age) only depend on him accepting the fifth, "primary" version. However, any reader who skimmed p. 132 might have missed my important point, and I should have underscored it more, perhaps in a summary or conclusion.

For more details and a summary of why understanding the different versions of the Principle allows us to grasp Aristotelian theory more fully, especially regarding finite things or events, see:
EPSpress.com/NTF/VariousVersionsOfThePrinciple.pdf

Reviews of Aristotle's “Not to Fear” Proof

Forthcoming, as a publication officially announces any, or as submitted directly to us at info@EPSpress.com.


Related publications (in chronological order)

Forthcoming, as they appear.

Replies, Reviews and Comments on Related Publications

(Unless noted, comments are by G. Scott)

The following are replies or comments on works that became known after publication.

1. The Relevance of Preus's "Aristotle's Natural Necessity"?

Shortly after the publication of Aristotle's "Not to Fear" Proof, Anthony Preus's article "Aristotle's Natural Necessity" (Filosophia, 1969; 91-100) re-appeared through Academia.edu. It was an article that I had missed in my research. Perhaps Preus (or someone familiar with his article) discovered that my new book argues that the universe for Aristotle is necessarily eternal in Theta 8 and that the Northern Greek renounces his own view in Lambda that the universe is contingently eternal (but in the logical sense of "contingent"), as I explain more in a Note above and in the fourth "digital extension" listed at the bottom: "The Ambiguity of 'Possible' in Aristotle's Unmoved Mover aka God: The Stagirite's Triangular Modal Model...". As I further suggested, Aristotle's youthful theory of the contingent eternal universe follows Plato (e.g., Timaeus 41a-b) and is a theory that had caused the Stagirite to posit the Unmoved Mover of Pure Actuality, which itself is (at least logically) necessary because it has no potentiality whatsoever. This was Aristotle's first way of trying to advance beyond Plato. In not having any potential, the Mover has no potential to go out of existence, and moreover it somehow guarantees the motion and existence of the (contingent) universe despite the absence of any physical mechanism whatsoever that would allow it to interact with the universe or vice-versa.

Perhaps Preus or a surrogate wanted to remind us of two passages in his "Aristotle's Natural Necessity" that might be thought to undercut the "Not to Fear" Proof, and so I address them here.

As Preus says:

At the end of Met. ∆ 5 Aristotle contrasts those things whose necessity comes from something else and those whose necessity is in themselves. If something has its necessity in itself, this is simple necessity, and that which is simply necessary is eternal and immovable; "nothing compulsory (bíaion) or against their nature (parà phúsin) attaches to them" (1015b15). The clear sense of the passage is that eternal and immovable beings are the ultimate sources of the necessity in that which owes its necessity to something else. The prime mover is said to be simply necessary (Met. Λ.7, 1072b11); the everlasting heavenly bodies are said to be simply necessary at the beginning of PA and elsewhere, and are said to be the source of necessity in temporal entities in GA II.1 and IV, and MA. Aristotle does not say but everywhere denies, that matter is 'eternal and unmovable', and he never says that either matter or anything made of terrestrial matter is simply (haplōs) necessary.

… There is some plausibility in an argument which says that the necessity of matter is simple because matter itself goes through a cyclical process, but this is a misunderstanding of the character of Aristotle's notion of a cyclical process. That which is permanent in the cyclical process is form; it is the continued existence of the form, not the accidental effects of the matter, which is simply necessary (pp. 92-3; my bolding and italics).

Even though Preus recognizes, then, that for Aristotle the everlasting heavenly bodies are the source of necessity in temporal entities, he suggests with the last passage that what is eternal about the heavenly bodies is their form and not their matter. This implies that the sun and stars and other heavenly bodies of Theta 8 are somehow not fully eternal; only their form is, all of which would seemingly undercut my conclusions in the "Not to Fear" Proof.

However, Preus has missed these important statements in Theta 8 and the Physics:

…if there is an eternal mover [and for Aristotle there is], it is not potentially in motion except in respect of 'whence' and 'whither'; there is nothing to prevent its having matter for this (1050b20-22).

…for movement does not imply for them [the celestial entities], as it does for perishable things, the potentiality for opposites, so that the continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is matter and potentiality, not actuality, that causes this [laboriousness for the perishables] (1050b24-28).

Motion is in a sense the opposite both of a state of rest and of the contrary motion (Physics VIII 7, 261b18-9).

In brief, the form and matter of the celestial entities like the sun and stars move eternally, along their absolutely unique and unchanging circular paths that prevent them from ever crashing into, and destroying, one another. They have no potentiality for "opposites," namely, to stop or reverse their motion in any way; they only have the eternal accident to move forward, similar to a car with no reverse gear or a fish.

Fuller details are given in Aristotle's "Not to Fear" Proof in the sections "Aristotle and Eternal Accidents" (pp. 197-200) and "Doctrinal Reasons the 'Not to Fear' Proof Was Not Seen" (pp. 247ff, especially pp. 248-50 and 268-76).

In short, Preus's otherwise illuminating article in no way threatens the conclusions of the "Not to Fear" Proof.

First published Summer, 2019
2. Comments on Michael Bordt, "Why Aristotle's God is Not the Unmoved Mover," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. XL, Summer (2011)  91-109.

Going against a long tradition that includes Thomas Aquinas, Bordt argues that the Unmoved Mover is not God (or vice-versa) for Aristotle. The Unmoved Mover has no potentiality whatsoever, thus no matter and no life in the Aristotelian or Platonic sense that requires a soul and movement. By contrast, God thinks of itself thinking and has life. Bordt's incisive analysis of Metaphysics Lambda reveals many inconsistent (or absurd) aspects of Aristotle's theory along with Aquinas's overly casual identification.

In no way though does Bordt impact my arguments, which cover both the Unmoved Mover and a Nous that (only) thinks of itself thinking, the kind of God that only a Narcissus should idealize and the kind of Nous that Aristotle inherited from Xenophanes and Anaxagoras. Bordt only recognizes Anaxagoras and therefore misses that each philosopher gets progressively more idealistic in his conception of Nous. For Xenophanes, God, which moves the world only with his thought, has both a nous and a body. For Anaxagoras Nous has no body but still interacts somehow with the universe, being the first Intelligent Designer; as I argued in unpublished conference papers from the 1990s, Nous puts motion and order into the physical Parmenidean “Soup” that, e.g., must be the same everywhere to be Real (cf. my pp. 232-3). For Aristotle Nous is not even aware of a physical universe. It focusses completely on itself, if one could even call this type of Nous an “it” or “itself.” Where is it located? What are its boundaries or what is its shape? These are just three questions we can ask about any entity that has life and it is completely baffling how Aristotle could answer them concerning the God of Lambda.

Other absurdities abound. Insofar as the Mover is Pure Actuality with no potentiality it could not interact with the physical universe in any way whatsoever, either actively or passively, which is one of the reasons Aristotle instead relies in his mature years on the Not to Fear Proof to explain the necessary eternality of the universe and its motion. Insofar as God only thinks of itself thinking, it has absolutely no concern for human beings or any other aspect of physical reality; indeed, again, it does not even know that the physical universe exists. Hence it is also Supreme Ignorance. If it has life, it must have matter and potentiality, but then it could go out of existence at some moment in eternal time. Why does Aristotle, then, (merely) assert it is eternal? If the Northern Greek's claims that God has the best type of life are construed to be arguments for the eternality of God, then Aristotle assumes what he is trying to prove; unless it can be shown that a living God with matter is eternal, the issue of whether it has the best life is completely moot.

Even leaving this whole issue aside, how does Nous guarantee the existence and motion of a contingent universe? The only way in which the universe would keep moving, at first glance, would be were Nous qua God like a giant Zeus that entities in the universe could perceive. Yet why would the heavenly entities not move toward it, or rotate like a dancer doing pirouettes, rather than move in an eternal circle because of it, the final option being the traditional reading that stems from Aristotle saying that the moved entities move because they perceive an (unmoving) beloved? Worse, what is to stop the universe from disappearing, in which case its ostensible eternal motion is irrelevant?

In short, the answer as to why a God (or an Unmoved Mover) generates eternal circular motion of the outermost heavens has always been, and is, impossible to determine and indeed any attempt leads to additional dilemmas (cf. my pp. 290-9 for more details). Bordt touches on none of them, and thus his final claim that Aristotle “offers us a truly breathtaking metaphysics,” takes on a surely unintended meaning. The preposterously breathtaking claims of the youthful Stagirite's Unmoved Mover and Nous of Lambda, whatever their relation, are even more evidence that the Northern Greek would not have maintained that theory in the face of immediate, obvious and devastating objections from either Platonists after the time of the Phaedrus or colleagues in the Lyceum (cf. my pp. 243-6; 266-7; 280-1; 287; 292; 300-4; 309; and 313).

First published July 2019
3. Comments on Christopher Frey, "Capacities and the Eternal in Metaphysics Θ.8 and De Caelo," Phronesis, 60 (2015)  88-126.

Frey states that “the dominant interpretation of Metaphysics Theta 8 commits Aristotle to the claim that heavenly bodies' eternal movements are not the exercises of capacities. Against this, I argue that these movements are the result of necessarily exercised capacities [my italics].” My book depends on the “dominant interpretation,” and below I summarize what I believe is wrong with Frey's article.

Frey focusses on the chapter (Theta 8) and treatise De Caelo that are crucial. He gives an illuminating account of aither, sometimes thought historically to be the medium for interstellar perception, correctly revealing that it is in this context considered by Aristotle to be the “always running” outer heaven (or an associated body). Frey subsequently, however, takes the unwarranted step of trying to justify his claim that eternal movements are the result of necessarily exercised capacities. In this context, he agrees that capacity (dunamis) is synonymous in Theta 8 with potentiality, and I have shown that both become functionally equivalent to possibility, as I explain on pp. 86-7; 91-2; 102-3; 143; and 188. As Frey recounts, the crucial matter for the Northern Greek is: “Nothing eternal is potentially, or is in capacity” (p. 89). Frey then arrives at his own conclusions, against the “dominant interpretation,” by changing some crucial text in Theta 8, having it read “no unactualized potentiality” rather than what the Greek plainly is: “no potentiality.” He then ultimately reverses the priority of capacity (= potentiality) and actuality for Aristotle and says: “Everyone agrees that the heaven's circular motion is eternal and is eternal necessarily. The disagreement concerns whether this movement's eternality is consistent with its being the exercise of an underlying capacity. There is no simple reconciliation of this tension (p. 90).”

Why Frey's argument against the “dominant interpretation” is wrong and why there is indeed a simple reconciliation, or at least a simple explanation, follows. I start with the latter point.

In Theta 8, Aristotle has a model that does not allow an eternally unfulfilled capacity. Stephen Makin astutely saw this in his close analysis of Theta, and explicitly says that the model is different from the model(s) of the previous chapters in Theta. Frey discusses Makin but completely ignores Makin's brilliant observation (which Makin then never leverages, and if he had, he would probably have stolen my thunder). Thus, for Aristotle, if something (like an alleged possibility or alleged potentiality) is never fulfilled in eternity (“unactualized” in Frey's terms), it is actually impossible (even if one makes a fictional claim and says that it is a conceptual possibility); if always fulfilled, it is necessary; if fulfilled at least once it is contingent (possible or potential). Those are the only options and this is the “temporal” notion of the modals.

Frey has simply missed this relevant sense of the modals that Hintikka and Broadie already recognized in their own way. Although Frey cites a later work of Broadie in which she deals with the Unmoved Mover, he either is unaware of her Passage and Possibility or does not consider it to be relevant, nor does he cite Hintikka at all. None of this entails that he is ignorant of the renowned Finnish-American scholar but Frey must think that Hintikka's views are irrelevant. Here, I do not refer to Hintikka's (or Broadie's) early views, in which the “temporal” notion of possibility qua contingency is applied to all domains, but to Hintikka's mature view, in which he recognized that the modals for Aristotle have different paradigms depending on the domain. In other words, “possibility” or “necessity” (and potential/capacity) are equivocal and we must be aware of the exact sense of the term in any given domain, or better yet, in any given argument because even in one domain, like ontology or dramatic theory, Aristotle may, and does, use one term in different ways. Otherwise, if we over-simplify the meanings of the terms, as so many scholars have done, we distort the Northern Greek's thought.

First published July 28, 2019
4. A Theologian's Response to the "5th Element," Fifteenth Annual Marquette Seminar on Aristotle and Aristotelianism, "Causes and Causation in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition," June 20-23, 2021.

In a session on the Unmoved Mover qua God, a theologian suggested that the God of Metaphysics Lambda created the 5th element, which had been suggested to be theoretically more powerful than the "ensouled outer spheres" that allegedly move because of their love and desire for the Mover. The pdf at this link explains why a philosopher would not make, or accept, such a comment:
A Theologian on the Fifth Element

First published June 26, 2021

Related Links

The following are "digital extensions" of the book:

1. Does the Unmoved Mover Necessarily Imply the Physical Universe?
   A scholar who teaches ancient and medieval philosophy, and the history of logic, asks whether and how the views in Aristotle's "Not to Fear" Proof would handle the kind of position that Averroes champions.

2. Various Versions of the Principle of Plenitude
   As noted above, this provides a summary of the various versions of the Principle of Plenitude and why understanding them allows us to grasp Aristotelian theory pertaining to the issues at hand more fully.

3. Aristotle, Cantor and the Principle of Plenitude
   Anne Newstead explains how Cantor not only follows Spinoza in some ways but appeals to God's thinking and the Principle of Plenitude to argue for the legitimacy of actual infinities, contra the Stagirite. Because of the views developed in Aristotle's "Not to Fear" Proof, the discussion at this link shows not only that Aristotle's position is unscathed but that the "thinking" of Nous in Metaphysics Lambda could not be engaging in the divine thinking that, for Cantor, allows infinities to be actual.

4. The Ambiguity of “Possible” in Aristotle's Unmoved Mover aka God: The Stagirite's Triangular Modal Model, not a Modern Modal Square, and the Ramifications for the “Not to Fear” Proof
   Stemming from Naomi Reshotko's “From the Cosmology of the Timaeus, through the Metaphysics of Anankē, to the Epistemology of the Forms” at the conference in honor of Sarah Broadie, Marquette University, February 2020, this clarifies further Aristotle's use of the modals "possible" and "necessary" in Lambda, how the Stagirite cannot be using his mature "ontological" sense of these modals, and why the options are either Platonic senses or a (merely) logical sense that is found in deductions like syllogisms with terms that can be, and sometimes are, completely fictional. None of these other senses of the modalities undercut the conclusions of the "Not to Fear" Proof, and, if anything, strengthen them.

5. Consigning Aristotle's “God” to Oblivion
   This continues the discussions and private exchanges with specialists after the conference at Marquette. One scholar offers three objections to the conclusion that, because the Stagirite realized the physical universe was necessarily eternal in virtue of its own nature, he drops the otiose Unmoved Mover by mid-career. Not only are replies given to each objection but a Postscript rigorously evaluates the claims of Philip Merlan, who has had significant influence with specialists, writing in the 1940's that the Northern Greek is actually "polytheistic." That is, Merlan tries to reconcile the seeming discrepancy of a single Unmoved Mover in Lambda 6 with at least 47 unmoved movers in Lambda 8, asserting that Aristotle can posit multiple entities of a certain class—“immaterial unmoved movers qua gods”—even without his normal requirement (as repeated in Lambda 8) that matter is required for individuation.

6. On Sarah Broadie's "Heavenly Bodies and First Causes" — Two Turning Points in the History of Theology: Aristotle's Divine "Fifth Element" and the Perversion by Alexander of Aphrodisias
   In 2009, Broadie provides the seeming justification for Aristotle holding the Unmoved Mover as an immaterial first cause, although she also explains the theoretical power of his theory of the outer spheres being a "fifth element," as was recognized in antiquity. This digital extension demonstrates that she could be right on the first point, but only concerning Aristotle's youthful theory. Broadie articulates the considerations that permit us to see more of the details of the Stagirite's mature theory (involving the ontological necessity of the universe in virtue of its own nature). The rest of the digital extension demonstrates that not one Peripatetic after Aristotle accepted the Unmoved Mover of No Potentiality. For instance, Strato, the third head of the Lyceum, utterly rejects immaterial causes, and Xenarchus of Seleucia, in the 1st century BCE, argues only against the "fifth element," while not countenancing the Unmoved Mover. Rather, it is only 500 years later, with Alexander of Aphrodisias erroneously interpreting Lambda to be the most mature theory, and with Plotinus shortly thereafter arguing against the straw man rather than against the "fifth element," that the modern tradition for Aristotle's theology gets cemented.

7. Plato Imitates Aristotle: Alcmaeon of Croton, Phaedrus 245c-e, and Laws 10
   As demonstrated in the previous digital extensions, the Stagirite abandoned by 360-355 the immaterial, unchanging Unmoved Mover of Metaphysics Lambda 6 (usually, but not always, identified with the "God," of Lambda 7) in favor of the eternally moving "fifth element" that nevertheless is always the same.
   Until now, Plato's proof for the human and divine soul in Phaedrus 245c-e has been thought by specialists to have come directly, if only essentially, from Alcmaeon, a renowned physician who moonlighted as a philosopher, despite the proof generating tensions with the Phaedo and despite some remarkable similarities with mature Aristotelian doctrine. In this final digital extension, Scott offers a more plausible hypothesis: Because the Stagirite wrote a (lost) book on the Crotoniate according to Diogenes, it is reasonable to assume, and Laws 10 helps confirm, that the Athenian follows his Stagirite colleague regarding Alcmaeon. That is, notwithstanding that Plato always maintains a belief in a supernatural entity, he mimics Aristotle in the realm of ontology by irrevocably dropping the immaterial and unmoving Forms in favor of the primary reality of the (world) soul that moves eternally in virtue of its own nature. Hence, eternal movement for both thinkers becomes the primary ontological "predicate," not unmoving immateriality.
   Scott further augments his published reasons for the metic Aristotle not broadcasting his theological apostasy (beyond a trusted inner circle): In Laws 10, the Athenian also mandates jailing atheists for at least 5 years or killing them (908a-909a). Aristotle might as well have openly acknowledged being Catholic in the court of Queen Elizabeth I or being Huguenot in the courts of Louis XIV and XV.

8. Critolaus and Atticus on Aristotle
   Neither Critolaus, the head of the Peripatos in the 2nd century BCE, nor Atticus, the Platonizing anti-Aristotelian Christian from the 2nd century CE, show any awareness of the Stagirite advocating the completely immaterial Unmoved Mover of Metaphysics Lambda 6, which has usually been held since Alexander of Aphrodisias in the 3rd century CE to be the same entity as ho theos, the "god" of Lambda 7-8. However, that entity has a blessed life, and for Aristotle life requires matter.
   In addition, Critolaus and Atticus both address the Stagirite's "divine" fifth element, confirming Scott's thesis that the Mover was Aristotle's youthful doctrine and was dropped in favor of that fifth element, the "always running" aether that includes the "outer spheres" and that is eternal in virtue of its own nature. The two thinkers also provide further evidence for Scott's position that not one philosopher, whether Peripatetic or not, accepted—or, apart from Theophrastus' dismissive remarks in passing, even cared to discuss—the Mover for 500 years, until Alexander (and Plotinus) mistakenly ignored Aristotle's evolution and set for posterity Lambda as his one and only onto-theology.
   As the title of the pdf suggests, this is expected to be the final "digital extension. See the following "Announcement."

Announcement
The digital extensions cover scholarship that either appeared after publication or that was missed by Scott before publication in 2019. A 2nd edition is planned that combines the 1st edition with the digital extensions, which obviously will increase both the size of the book and the cost but which will conveniently locate all the texts. At that point, the 1st edition will no longer be available. Furthermore, as of Aug 2021, the price of the 1st edition was dramatically reduced to encourage feedback for the final draft of the 2nd edition.
   However, given notice in December 2021 from a professional journal that a Book Review of the current edition can be expected, the 2nd edition may not appear before 2023 or 2024, in case the Review triggers any revision. For those interested in providing additional feedback, especially if they wish it published here, and with the understanding that it may be addressed in the new volume, please see ConditionsForSubmissions.pdf or email us at: info@epspress.com




Edited 4/14/24