In what appears to be a last gasp by the Old Guard to defend the catharsis-clause in the definition of tragedy in Aristotle's Poetics, Ferrari offers a meaning of katharsis that was unknown in Ancient Greece, namely, “aesthetic satisfaction.” When examining related passages in Politics VIII 7, he further claims that catharsis is not associated with the realm of entertainment/relaxation (functioning, as Aristotle says, like a medicine) but rather with that of “leisurely activity” (diagōgē), itself often translated in the context Ferrari addresses as “intellectual enjoyment” or “past-time.”
I leave aside here the differences between entertainment/relaxation and diagōgē, which the Stagirite explains in Politics VIII 5 and which Claudio W. Veloso addresses more in his own review, as noted at ADMCupdates. I focus here primarily on what catharsis means for Ferrari. He says: “The pleasure attending dramatic catharsis, according to Aristotle, is a pleasure the audience feels when the tension that has been developing throughout the action of the play is released... Catharsis...is an aesthetic satisfaction. ...the pleasure attending musical catharsis, too, is shown to be an aesthetic satisfaction, corresponding in this respect to dramatic catharsis” (p. 117; my italics).
Leaving aside the little matter that katharsis never had this meaning in Ancient Greece and that Aristotle writes in a manner in Politics VIII 6-7 that presupposes the reader understands the term immediately, the first problem is that Ferrari equivocates. In his initial sentence above, whatever catharsis is, it is not pleasure. The pleasure attends it. (Analogously, the servant attends the king but the servant is not the king.) However, Ferrari then wants catharsis itself to be aesthetic satisfaction, and if that is not a species of pleasure, I have no idea what pleasure is. Indeed, he alleges that the pleasure “is shown to be an aesthetic satisfaction.” Is catharsis attended by pleasure or is it itself pleasure (as at p. 157)? Ferrari cannot have it both ways and it is only by switching back and forth when convenient throughout his very long article in ways too painful to recount that he arrives at his various conclusions. In fact, Ferrari does not simply go between these two notions of catharsis. It also becomes “relief/release“ (e.g., pp. 150 and 154) and “in both works [the Politics and the Dramatics aka Poetics] is being treated as a purely aesthetic affair” (p. 156), even though it is at least in part a psychological release for Ferrari and even though he finally translates the term in the definition of tragedy as “purge” (p. 159). The meanings of catharsis in this article change faster than the masks of pantomime in Roman days.
Moreover, Aristotle never says anywhere that pleasure attends dramatic catharsis. At the closest, in Politics VIII 7 a pleasure results from (let us even say “attends”) the catharsis of various emotions in certain musical rites. Thus, in Ferrari's terms above, the catharsis would be the “release” (that is, the “purgation” that scholars have traditionally rendered the term in VIII 7). Catharsis itself would not be the “aesthetic satisfaction.” It is the servant of the king “pleasure” (or of any of its species, like aesthetic satisfaction). Ferrari tries to claim that what holds for music (in terms of catharsis) also holds for tragedy but he ignores completely the Northern Greek's clear statement in Chapter 25 (1460b14-15) that different arts have different principles. In addition, in no way does Ferrari address the paradoxes that get generated by implying that there are multiple types of catharsis, musical and dramatic, of which more below.
As another part of Ferrari's admittedly clever but untenable interpretation, catharsis is something that only educated audiences get. Incomprehensibly, Ferrari tries to explain what cathartic music was without addressing the only two direct references to catharsis in music in Politics VI (1341a17-26) and VII (1342a31-42b17). Bafflingly, he also never explores the ramifications of Aristotle having already discussed catharsis regarding the aulos in VIII 6, as if Greek readers would perfectly well understand the term, and only subsequently, in VIII 7, Aristotle referring to a treatise peri poiētikēs (presumably our Dramatics aka Poetics) for an explanation of the term, an oddity that Veloso has explored more than I in our previous work and that I therefore leave for his own review. Nor does Ferrari address the music associated with the Phrygian mode in VIII 7, music that itself is best given by the aulos and paradigmatically found in the dithyramb, as Aristotle explains. The Northern Greek in those passages sets the modes of music designed for education and character against the passionate music of the aulos, all of which contradicts Ferrari's claims. In brief, Ferrari does not recognize the implication for his own view that the educated folk would best prefer the dithyramb, nor does he recognize the even more absurd implication that the educated folk would not prefer the music of character or of education, among many other oddities. In short, the above is just a sample of the kind of reasoning that he exhibits, and as a result his article becomes more a casuistry of catharsis than a reasonable philosophical analysis of Aristotle's related theory in the Dramatics and Politics.
Ironically in this context, a (proper) pleasure is exactly the goal of tragedy and the musical arts for Aristotle for, e.g., Veloso and myself, all of which is clearly seen if one understands that katharsis was wrongly interpolated in the definition and if one pays attention to the rest of the Dramatics, in which (a proper) pleasure is stated, e.g., in Chapter 23 to be the goal of epic in its own definition, as in “tragedy.” Ferrari notes Veloso's and my own work in passing, barely touching on a few of the points and, disappointingly, in a misleading manner. He in no way that does justice to Aristotle addresses our arguments.
Consider Ferrari's replies to but a fraction of my own arguments (as found in Aristotle on Dramatic Musical Composition [ADMC]), specifically the ones dealing with the authenticity of catharsis in Dramatics 6. Ferrari acknowledges a serious problem that throws into doubt the legitimacy of the catharsis-clause, namely, that Aristotle, given his statement that he arrives at the definition of tragedy based on what he has said, does not seem to anticipate the terms catharsis, pity and fear in the clause in Chapters 1-5, whereas he does anticipate other essential conditions. Ferrari attempts to resolve the problem as follows:
The...solution is to hold that the catharsis of pity and fear has in fact been anticipated in earlier chapters—not
specifically, but thematically, generally. The anticipation comes in ch. 4, when
Aristotle adduces in support of his claim that the pleasure we take in imitations
is natural to us the fact that objects that would pain us to behold in real life we
can behold with pleasure in visual representations, if these are well executed
(1448b10-12). The catharsis of pity and fear, also, is a case in which art transforms
pain into pleasure—the emotions of pity and fear, painful in real life, are
aroused by the drama in such a way that they yield pleasure in the audience
(the pleasure of catharsis) (p. 157; my italics).
...
[Then, pertaining to the oddity that “completeness” does not appear to be obviously mentioned before the definition, other than through its implied connection with megethos (size) in Chapter 5]: That tragedy should possess a certain magnitude (different from, say, that
of epic) is a normative notion, and as such could be taken to imply the equally
normative notions of wholeness and of having a proper beginning, middle and
end—...if it [the normative notion] is accepted, then the reasoning that is good enough in
the case of 'completeness' ought to be good enough also in the case of 'catharsis
of pity and fear'. (The catharsis-clause, on this account, seems, if anything,
more clearly anticipated than is the notion of completeness.) (p. 158; my italics).
...
Gregory Scott, for whom the fact that the catharsis-clause is not anticipated in the first
five chapters is the second main plank of his argument that the clause should be athetized
(Scott 2003, 233-43), has attempted a fuller defence of the claim that completeness
is anticipated after all. In Scott 2016, 370-5, he proposes that the notion is suggested either by earlier references to the norms of length for tragedy (megethos, again) or in the very concept of 'action'. The concept of 'action' is a good deal vaguer in its connection to that
of 'completeness' than is the concept of normative length; but if Scott accepts either,
then by parity of reasoning he should accept the anticipation of the catharsis-clause that
I propose. (Scott's third option is to suppose a lacuna; but this is a resort that tailors a text
to fit a conclusion one already has in mind, and cannot carry the day alone.) (p. 159)
Let us see what is wrong with Ferrari's assessment. First, Anton Smerdel, Gerald Else, Richard McKirihan and myself, among the few others whom Ferrari acknowledges, accept that “completeness” is strongly implied by the passage in Ch. 4 on megethos, and there is absolutely no doubt about the precise implication because of how extensively and explicitly Aristotle ties length and completeness together in Chapters 7. That is, the anticipation is not merely thematic but specific.
Second, not only D.W. Lucas but M.P. Battin accepted that “action” strongly implies completeness, and true implication seems good enough on Aristotle's theory of definition, as long as the implication is made explicit in the collection of the necessary conditions in the definiens per se. Yet even if “action” by itself does not justify completeness being in the definition because “action” is too vague, megethos, or at least the further discussion in Chapter 5, of which more in a moment, does. I should add now that the combination of megethos and action complement each other, providing even more, mutual support for the legitimacy of completeness. There is nothing remotely similar for catharsis, or more importantly, for the connection of catharsis, pity and fear, and in fact in Chapter 14, when Aristotle discusses the goal of a dramatist, he mentions the pleasure from pity and fear, not catharsis, all of which supports Veloso's and my position more than Ferrari's own.
Third, it is overly optimistic for Ferrari to say that I should accept by parity of reason the catharsis-clause being anticipated by us getting pleasure at looking at drawings of corpses. To add that “the catharsis-clause...seems...more clearly anticipated than is the notion of completeness” is even wild. I start with the latter claim. As alluded to already, completeness and magnitude are intertwined, as Aristotle explains in depth in Chapter 7 (which Ferrari well recognizes), and the notion in Chapter 5 (1449b13-14) of the tragedy being no more than approximately one revolution of the sun already necessarily implies completeness. Ferrari does not consider this passage and implication. If a play is bounded and has a limit, it must be complete: “what has nothing outside it is complete and whole ... as a whole man or box [and, we might add, a whole play],” Physics III 6, 206b34-207a14. Moreover, to claim that, in formulating an Aristotelian definition, a general theme more clearly anticipates an essential condition than a specific similar concept or than a specific necessary entailment reflects a view of existence and of Aristotelian thought more redolent of fiction and the "good story" of Ferrari's title than of empirical philosophy. Finally, although Aristotle takes great pains to ensure the legitimacy of completeness and its connection to megethos in Chapter 7, there is not one word more on catharsis in the whole treatise. Ferrari tries to resolve this problem—and the related absence of any explicit explanation of catharsis as promised by Politics VIII 7—by saying that:
What he [Aristotle] means by the catharsis-clause in the definition of tragedy is, in effect, that tragic drama arouses and works with pity and fear in an audience in such a way that the audience gets satisfaction out of that pity and fear. The term 'catharsis', then, as used in the catharsis-clause, adds little more to Aristotle's analysis of plot-construction (his analysis of the devices by which the audience's pity and fear are manipulated) than the declaration that this (the arousal and working-through of pity and fear in the course of a convincing tragic drama) is something that audiences enjoy. That is why catharsis itself does not require separate, explicit analysis in the Poetics. The explanation of just why audiences enjoy it, which is the explanation of catharsis, is already contained in the analysis of plot-construction, with its account of what shape a tragic plot must take in order to succeed in gripping or surprising us (p. 164; my italics).
This is all as preposterous as an engineer claiming in one publication that he will explain “jet engine” in another manual and then someone avowing the engineer has explained it when the engineer describes in a manual the routes of possible flights, how long the routes can take, how many gallons of gas the plane could hold, and how many people could be carried on the plane, mentioning the word “jet engine” in the manual only one time. The claim that the discussion of “plot-construction” is the explanation of catharsis as promised by Politics VIII 7 is so implausible that we must wonder whether we should continue reading anything more by Ferrari on this whole topic. If only, though, out of politeness or a concern for rigor, let us continue. I finish with one additional point on this precise topic: Aristotle suggests in the Rhetoric that it is pleasure, not catharsis, that we get with suspense and surprising endings, the two aspects of "detective fiction" that Ferrari emphasizes heavily throughout the rest of his article to try to make sense of plot-construction. As the Stagirite writes: “Dramatic turns
of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from peril are pleasant, because we feel all
such things are wonderful (thaumasta,“ Rhetoric 1371b10-12). Were catharsis (whether or not through pity and
fear) applicable for Aristotle, he would have mentioned it here instead of focusing on what is pleasant and wonderful (the goal of music and of tragedy for myself and Veloso, being in effect part of the "proper pleasure" that all serious drama has as its goal).
In brief, the alleged “general theme” of us taking pleasure in fine drawings of painful subject-matter that ostensibly anticipates catharsis through pity and fear is so oblique as to be irrelevant, and Veloso more precisely and more completely rebuts Ferrari on this matter in Veloso's own response (again, see Veloso's Rebuttal of Ferrari on Musical Catharsis ). Thus, I add nothing more here other than to say that Aristotle's theory of definition, which seems to scare away Ferrari and other literary theorists, does not allow general themes to be collected in a definition in different forms (Posterior Analytics II 8-10, with more conclusive passages being Posterior Analytics II 13.96b36-97b24; Physics II 9.200a14 and 200b6-8; Parts of Animals I 1-2; Metaphysics VII 12.1037b29-1038a36 and especially V 8.1017b17-2). On Ferrari's overly broad criterion, we might as well say (also absurdly) that some emotion was mentioned once in Chapters 1-5 and that this authenticates the whole catharsis-clause. Leaving aside “completeness,” the other seven essential conditions having been specifically (and not merely thematically) introduced in Chapters 1-5 reveals still more the arbitrariness of Ferrari's claims.
Ferrari might yield on this issue but claim that the explanation of catharsis as promised by Politics VIII 7 is simply lost (perhaps because, as many have accepted, it was originally in the lost section of comedy). However, leaving aside the issue of how catharsis applied to tragedy if it had been primarily or wholly applied to comedy (a topic that is examined in my ADMC Chapters 7-8 and that Ferrari completely ignores), Ferrari must then accept that at least one very large passage after the definition of tragedy, probably the equivalent of a modern-day chapter of the treatise, is lost. Yet Petruševski long ago pointed out that the natural place for the explanation is when pity and fear are also explained in Chapter 13 and yet there is no obvious break in the discussion that would be the original location of the explanation of catharsis. Ferrari's silence on this matter is deafening. (Pity and fear are legitimate in both Chapter 13 and the first part of Chapter 14 but only, I argue, for some of the sub-types of tragedy as mentioned in Chapter 18, which is why the inclusion of the two emotions in the middle chapters is no good evidence for them being two essential conditions in the definition for all tragedy.)
Moreover, pity and fear themselves are never mentioned in Chapters 1-5, a matter that Ferrari never handles. Any suggestion that he has handled it (by claiming the similarity between [i] viewing a drawing of a corpse that involves both pain and pleasure and [ii] the catharsis of pity and fear) ignores Chapters 13, in which three categories of tragic plot-types have neither pity nor fear, according to the Stagirite. Indeed, Aristotle blatantly states that the plot with the virtuous person (epieikēs) going from fortune to misfortune has neither pity nor fear but is miaron (shocking/disgusting). If there is no pity and fear, a fortiori there cannot be a catharsis of pity and fear, whether or not one advocates that catharsis is explained in plot-construction. In short, Ferrari's account cannot handle the type of play that would include, e.g., Antigone or The Trojan Women, two paradigmatic tragedies, or any other tragedy per se with a virtuous protagonist going to misfortune. Besides, in Chapters 2-18 Aristotle gives a host of other plots that do not have pity, all of which Ferrari completely ignores (see ADMC 6, espec. pp. 427-9). If no pity, then a fortiori no pity and fear; if no pity and fear, then a fortiori no catharsis of the two emotions.
Fourth, Ferrari says “Scott's third option is to suppose a lacuna; but this is a resort that tailors a text to fit a conclusion one already has in mind, and cannot carry the day alone.” This is a serious mischaracterization of my view and reflects Ferrari simply setting up the proverbial straw man to knock it down. Ferrari cannot say with principled reasons that the texts are intact. His own interpretation of the Politics relies on the corruption of VIII 7. Moreover, there are many ellipses in the Dramatics that have never been filled in or filled in correctly, and absolutely no other commentator doubts this. Indeed, almost all traditional commentators claim the explanation of catharsis in the Dramatics (as promised in Politics VIII 7) is lost. If the presumably large passage on catharsis is lost, why not a (much shorter) passage on completeness (leaving aside the discussion of megethos and related issues in Chapter 5)? I give the account of Themistius that fills the gap in Chapter 4 regarding the history of tragedy and the number of primary actors (ADMC, pp. 397-8). All of this is evidence that even if my first two options (pertaining to magnitude or “action”) fail, the real first introduction of completeness was simply lost.
Fifth, Ferrari ignores my fourth possible solution (p. 375 in Edition 1, which is superseded by Edition 2, itself presenting the same discussion on pp. 393-399, with an additional argument). I summarize now that discussion. The fourth and final solution does not even require that completeness (teleias) has an antecedent. Perhaps Aristotle abrogates slightly his biological approach to definition, and both Ferrari and Veloso accept that a new condition could be added to the definition even if not previously introduced. This might have been something easy to do if at the last moment Aristotle realized he had omitted a condition when the manuscript for the first five chapters was finished (obviously he had no word processor to redo those chapters easily). Indubitably, though, he wants teleias in the definition, given the aforementioned extensive discussion of how teleias relates to megethos in Chapter 7. It would be then entirely inconsistent for the Northern Greek to introduce katharsis out of the blue also in the definition and then not expand it. Thus, whether or not Aristotle follows perfectly his “biological-type” definition, teleias is warranted but katharsis not. That, however, Aristotle wants to follow his theory of definition is not only shown by him collating all eight of the previously-introduced conditions into the definiens (assuming I am right about teleias) but immediately explaining the term hedusmenō (having occurred as “sweetened” in “sweetened language”) in the very first sentence after the definiens as rhuthmos kai harmonia: “ordered body movement (or dance) and music.” Rhuthmos and harmonia themselves had been very clearly introduced in Chapter 1. Aristotle's urgent need to explain hedusmenō, which had never been introduced in Chapters 1-5, reflects his desire to amend his lapse in not following his principles of definition. Moreover, if Ferrari were right about plot-construction in and of itself explaining catharsis, why wouldn't plot-construction also explain these and other concepts? Why would Aristotle even waste his time explaining “sweetened” when its “theme” had been introduced already in Chapter 1? Why would Aristotle waste his time expaining pity and fear in Chapter 13? Surely, if plot-construction explains catharsis, it explains the two emotions also.
Sixth, even if Ferrari rejects the arguments above for the legitimacy of “completeness,” why are the other seven conditions briefly and indubitably introduced in Chapters 1-5 and then collected in the definition of tragedy, following Aristotle's own theory of definition, but catharsis, pity and fear not? Ferrari ignores this highly salient consideration. M.P. Battin once wrote that the definition of tragedy is the only example in the whole corpus where Aristotle gives a rigorous definition following his own strictures but she cleverly tried to explain away the out-of-place catharsis-clause by saying that it must have been important to Aristotle because it destroys the integrity of his rigorous definition! The more sensible interpretation is that it was wrongly added by a later editor who, like Ferrari and the literary theorists for generations, did not recognize the Northern Greek's rules of definition and how they apply here.
These are just a few of the issues that Ferrari has not handled, and I believe, cannot handle; otherwise, he presumably would have addressed them. (If he is not even aware of them after citing myself and Veloso, that may be worse than him not handling them.)
At this point in time, the only scholar who has (admirably) attempted a rigorous defense of the catharsis-clause against the articles in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy by Veloso and myself (listed at Related Publications) and by implication against Petruševski, thereby deepening our understanding of Aristotle, is Stephen Halliwell in Between Ecstasy and Truth: Interpretations of Greek Poetics from Homer to Longinus (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2011, pp. 260-5. However, Veloso, Rashed and I have systematically rebutted Halliwell on all points in our own publications from 2016-8, and anyone trying to revive the catharsis-clause, unless they wish to risk their professional reputation, is advised to handle those rebuttals: Scott, ADMC Chapter 6, Vol. 2, 2018, pp. 393-440; and Rashed and Veloso in, respectively, the Preface (pp. 15-8) and Chapter 6 (notably pp. 321-2; 326; 341-4; 350; 361; and 372) of Veloso's Pourqoui, 2018. That potentially bold (or rash) scholar is also advised to take into account the considerations for trying to apply (for Aristotle) the relevance of catharsis to any possible sub-type of tragedy, as given in Chapter 18 of the Dramatics, or in comedy; cf. Scott, A Primer on Aristotle's DRAMATICS (also known as the POETICS), 2019, Appendix 1 (click here for more information: A Primer). In other words, scholars who attempt to revive catharsis in the definition of tragedy (or who continue to claim its authenticity) risk being like proponents of phlogiston after the discoveries of Lavoisier and Priestly, given all of the evidence and arguments starting with Petruševski that demonstrate the inauthenticity of katharsis against the tradition that in over 1000 years cannot even translate the one word correctly.
Finally, even prudent scholars wishing to advocate different kinds of catharsis—some for music, some for tragedy, some for comedy, some for dance, some for plot, some for language—need to consider the incredible combinations, complexities and dilemmas that can occur when the material conditions are juxtaposed (as with music, plot, language and dance in Aristotelian tragedy). The scholars also need to determine if Aristotle himself would have championed such complex theories of catharsis within the domain of the arts (as opposed to accepting a different meaning in, e.g., biology) because he certainly does not acknowledge them in the extant texts; again, see Appendix 1 in the just-cited A Primer.
In short, it is easy to solve (some) problems by changing the meaning of a word. Make god mean dog, because, e.g., each word has the same letters or because they both occur in the Bible or for any other fanciful reason, and you can easily prove the existence of god and claim that god loves us, being man's best friend. Yet obviously you then immediately trigger absurdities (although a debate about whether the universe was created by a French poodle or a German shepherd might make for an Aristophanic cosmogonical comedy). The same is the case with Ferrari making katharsis take the place of diagōgē in the Politics, which I have only alluded to here, and making it mean “aesthetic satisfaction,” which is so absurd as to be a theme of a second comedy, were it not seriously proposed by a well-known classicist from the University of California, Berkeley and published in a prestigious journal.
One last remark: It is remarkable that Ferrari and others of the Old Guard are perfectly willing to claim that the manuscripts of, e.g., Politics VIII 7 are corrupted and not something Aristotle could have written as is, because the text says that there are three goals of music but the Northern Greek gives at least four. Indeed, Ferrari spends three pages (pp. 120-2) evaluating which of the interpolations are most sensibly athetized and offering a new option. Yet, except for those who have been persuaded by, e.g., Petruševski, Freire, Veloso, Rashed and myself, those members of the Old Guard refuse to countenance seriously that the Dramatics also could have been similarly corrupted (and poorly repaired). With Halliwell, again, being the admirable exception, much less do they try to refute rigorously the arguments that the Petruševskians have published for catharsis being interpolated into the definition of tragedy. This unwillingness to countenance corruption of the Dramatics while easily countenancing corruption of Politics VIII 7 is the kind of inconsistency that always makes one wonder about an author's primary motives, because the ultimate goal seems not to be for truth or for principled rigorous demonstration.
Given that Veloso has written much lengthier and more systematic criticisms of Ferrari's article, I leave my own comments as is, except for a final one that applies not directly to catharsis but to some of Ferrari's laudable insights, which result from what was obviously a massive amount of research. What is, however, extremely disappointing, sad and one might say even tragic, given the theme of the article, is that some of those gems, and the fascinating “Appendix: Plato on the Ecstatic Rites,” will never get the attention they deserve because they are, in the case of the former, buried in a veritable swamp of unsustainable exegesis, and, in the case of the latter, prefaced by such a lengthy, implausible analysis that future readers may give up in frustration and disbelief before they encounter it. Without doubt, Ferrari is a delightful and delightfully clear writer and concocts a marvelous story. However, in philosophy, fiction, whether “detective fiction” or not, does not trump veracity. It is a pity that Ferrari, with his talent and in the one life he has, wastes so much time and effort trying to patch a doctrine that is unpatchable. Moreover, if 1000 years of failure continue merely to challenge others to concoct yet another interpretation of catharsis rather than to reveal the corrupted nature of the Dramatics, we might also be duly afraid that the others will similarly play phlogistonists and throw away some of their own professional years, when they could instead focus on topics that will be truly helpful in advancing our understanding of Aristotle and ancient aesthetics. Besides, these particular instances of pity and fear will probably never have a catharsis, even though they may well be part of a real-life tragedy, for what else should we call “throwing away lives”?
Postscript
After this Reply was written, an article by Andrew L. Ford (Classics, Princeton University), “Catharsis, Music, and the Mysteries in Aristotle” (SKENÈ, Journal of Theatre and Drama Studies, 2:1, 2016, 23-41) came more fully to my attention. Ferrari cites the article and appears to have been significantly influenced by it, also focussing on musical catharsis, Politics VIII, mysteries, how Chapter 4 of the (Dramatics aka) Poetics is instrumental in understanding catharsis in the definition in Chapter 6, etc. Given the details already presented above and in Veloso's own reply, and given Ford's lack of rigor, there is no need to reply to Ford's work. That is, even though, for instance, Ford could not probably have been aware of Marwan Rashed's article from 2016 (which argues that Aristotle could not have written katharsis in the definition of tragedy) before Ford published his own work during the same year, he completely ignores the views of the Petruševskians going back to 1954. He also continues to (mis)represent the Stagirite's treatise as one on poetry and literature when, ironically, given Ford's own title and focus, the treatise is primarily about “musical” theater (that includes dance). However—as I note at General Remarks—I will not tediously continue to repeat my views that have been published since 1999 in well-known journals or venues. Only one curiosity, then, is noted here and it is more relevant to Ferrari's take on Ford than to Ford himself.
Because Ferrari presents a new, if partially overlapping, view in 2019, he clearly is not convinced by Ford's position from 2016. Yet Ferrari ignores, and in effect takes a stance that even contradicts one important piece of relevant ancient evidence that Ford offers dealing with catharsis and education. Ferrari emphasizes repeatedly that catharsis is (only) for the educated audience; yet Ford reports (p. 30) a passage by Aristides Quintilianus:
Accordingly they say that there is a certain logic to Bacchic and similar rites whereby the feelings of anxiety (ptoiēsis) felt by less educated people, caused by their way of life or some misfortune, are cleared away (ekkathairētai) through the melodies and dances of the ritual in a joyful and playful way (Aristides Quintilianus: 3.25.14-19; my emphases).
For Ferrari not to acknowledge this passage, much less handle it, is utterly baffling, if not unconscionable.
- G. Scott (Visiting Research Fellow, Philosophy, Princeton University, 1995-7)
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